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STEM and the Local Economy

significant or desirable effects
on other measures of regional
well-being.
• Above-average STEM KSAs
are associated with increased
regional well-being, but
“high” may not be as high as is
typically assumed. Not all value
comes from college-degreed
STEM occupations. These
results show the importance
of many technician and
mechanical jobs that often
are overlooked or ignored in
articles, research, and policy
on the economic importance of
STEM jobs.
• Efforts to help dislocated
workers may be more effective
if they explore the skills
associated with previous
occupations and try to match
workers to occupations with
similar skill needs. Helping
workers make the case
for cross-cutting skills to
regional employers could be
a more effective economic
development strategy than
investment in big leaps of
unrelated retraining.
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Race to the Bottom?
Local Tax Break Competition and Business Location
Evan Mast
State and local governments in the
United States spend $45–$80 billion
each year on programs that encourage
economic development in a particular
geographic area (Bartik 2017; Kline
and Moretti 2014). These programs,
often called place-based policies,
typically offer tax breaks in an effort
to attract businesses or encourage
the growth of existing businesses.
These range from huge subsidies like
the $3 billion that Foxconn recently
received from the state of Wisconsin
to small programs that target local
small businesses. A crucial feature of
place-based policies is that they are
very decentralized—state and local
governments account for 80 percent of
total spending.
This article highlights findings from
a recent paper that focuses on two
potential effects of decentralization
in business tax breaks (Mast 2017).
First, competition between subnational
governments could increase total tax
exemptions. Second, local control of
tax breaks could cause firms to choose
locations where they produce more
value for the community. The latter
may occur because jurisdictions with
more to gain from landing a firm offer
larger exemptions, sending a signal
that could improve the match quality
between towns and firms.
These two effects are important for
evaluating policies that restrict which
governments can offer tax breaks, such
as proposals to ban state exemptions
or the recent moratorium on some

local exemptions in the Phoenix area.
Such proposals have attracted attention
recently, as Amazon and Foxconn have
conducted well-publicized searches for
locations for new expansions.
The Importance of Local Taxes
For Businesses
This article focuses on local, rather
than state, government tax breaks. State
and local taxes are a large component
of the total business tax burden—a
2014 estimate pegged total state and
local businesses taxes at $688 billion
versus total federal corporate income
tax revenues of $320 billion (Phillips et
al. 2015).1
While state incentive packages for
national searches are more heavily
publicized, local tax breaks are
important in many cases. First, most
firms do not search nationally when
considering an expansion or relocation.
Second, even for firms conducting
national searches, there is often a
second, local stage to their search.
For example, Foxconn considered
several sites in Racine and Kenosha
Counties after announcing their
intention to build in Wisconsin. Local
tax breaks also amount to large sums—
approximately $700 million in New
York State in 2013.
The Effect of Competition on Local
Tax Breaks
To begin, I study spatial competition
between local governments in New
York State. Do governments offer

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Competition from nearby local governments increases business tax breaks.
n Simulations suggest that businesses typically locate in the same towns that they
would have chosen if local tax breaks were not allowed.
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Figure 1 Tax Breaks in Towns with Different Levels of Local Competition
1.0
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more tax breaks when there are more
competitors nearby? In New York,
competitors are industrial development
agencies (IDAs), local economic
development agencies that represent
either a county or a town and offer tax
breaks in an effort to improve economic
conditions in their jurisdictions. While
every county has an IDA, only about 50
of 1,000 towns have their own agencies.
A town that does not have its own IDA
is represented by its county’s IDA.
The correlation between the
number of IDAs within 25 kilometers
and the dollars of tax breaks in a
town, shown in Figure 1, suggests
that competition increases tax breaks.
However, this association may reflect
other characteristics that are correlated
with high levels of competition—for
example, heavily populated areas have
both more competition and more
economic activity. To circumvent this
problem, I use geography to construct
a natural experiment.
Figure 2 shows the towns in
Ulster County labeled according to
the number of counties within 25
kilometers of the town. Within the
county, variation in this measure
appears to be idiosyncratic—it depends
mostly on whether a town is at the edge
or on the corner of its county. Noting
this, I compare towns within the same
county that have different numbers
of counties within 25 kilometers in
order to estimate the causal effect of
increased competition.
I find that an additional IDA within
25 kilometers increases the probability
that at least one business in a town
receives tax exemptions from 25 to
30 percent and increases the dollars
of exemptions by over 50 percent.
These estimates show that tax break
competition is not entirely driven by
competing states and suggest that tax
breaks are not exclusively a tool to help
firms on the margin of profitability.
I also show that the effect rapidly
fades out as the radius of competition
extends beyond 25 kilometers,
suggesting that competition is quite
local.
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations using New York State data.

The Effect of Tax Breaks on
Business Location
The previous exercise sheds light
on the effect of competition but says
little about how tax breaks affect firm

location. To address this question—in
particular, how business locations
would change if towns were not
allowed to offer tax breaks—I perform
a simulation exercise.

Figure 2 Example Variation in the Number of Counties within 25 km of a Town
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Race to the Bottom?

I develop a simple model of towns
offering tax breaks to attract firms.
Towns compete in a setting similar to
an auction, but with the twist that firms
also have preferences over towns, so

An additional IDA within 25 km
increases the probability that at
least one business in a town receives
tax exemptions from 25 to 30
percent and increases the dollars of
exemptions by over 50 percent.
they do not just select the town that
offers the largest tax break. I choose the
parameters of the model to match the
effect of competition estimated in the
previous section.
I use the estimated model to
simulate two counterfactual policies—
eliminating town IDAs (leaving
just county IDAs) and eliminating
all IDAs. I find that firms typically
choose the same location across the
two counterfactuals and a status quo
simulation, indicating that tax breaks
do little to improve the town/firm
match. The town most likely to land
a particular firm is the same in every
policy regime for about 85 percent of
firms.

This result occurs not because
firms do not care about tax breaks,
but because of the way that IDAs
interact with one another. For
example, suppose that Syracuse is
attractive to Firm A and has a very
high probability of winning when no
tax breaks are allowed. When local tax
breaks are allowed, competing towns
will offer tax breaks in an attempt to
cut into Syracuse’s lead, but Syracuse
will respond with an exemption
large enough to stay ahead of the
competition. This strategic behavior
reduces changes in firm location across
policy regimes.
Caveats
There are several important caveats
to these results, particularly for
those on firm location. As with any
simulation exercise, it is necessary to
make several simplifying assumptions.
The most important is that firms are
only choosing among towns in New
York State. This implies that my model
is best suited to firms conducting
a local search—such as retail and
services establishments, distribution
centers, or small manufacturing
ventures—or firms in the second stage
of a national search. Businesses in
my sample tend to be relatively small
and in retail or services, and I also
present survey evidence in the paper

suggesting that many firms search
within a local area.
NOTE
1. Office of Management and Budget,
Historical Tables: https://www.whitehouse
.gov/omb/historical-tables/ (accessed
January 3, 2018).
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Three New Databases from the Upjohn Institute
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•

Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes: Contains data on incentives and taxes for 33 states and 45 industries for the
past 26 years. It offers the most comprehensive information available to date on incentives to business for economic
development provided by state and local governments in the United States. Available for free at http://www.upjohn.org/
models/bied/home.php.

•

New Hires Quality Index: Matches newly hired workers to their wages by occupation, which is more closely tied to skill
demand than measures based on industry. The index accounts for changing demographics of hires, can be consistently
constructed from 2001 forward overall and for subgroups, does not rely on self-reported wages, and will be updated
monthly. Available for free at http://www.upjohn.org/nhqi/.

•

Promise Database: Interactive database of place-based scholarship (aka “Promise”) programs. Use this database to
generate profiles of individual programs or to sort programs by a variety of characteristics, including location, year
established, source of scholarship funding, type of community served, and other key characteristics. Available for free
at http://www.upjohn.org/promise/database/.

